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I. Introduction 
The international scientific community is in the midst of completing one of 
the most extraordinary endeavors in the history of science. It is seeking to 
discover the "Holy Grail" of our biological heritage by mapping and 
sequencing the entire human genetic code through the Human Genome 
Project. The human genome (i.e., all our genetic material) contains 30,000 
to 40,000 genes (or possibly as few as 26,000)1 that are located along our 
46 chromosomes. The chromosomes in the nucleus of our cells are made 
mostly from a DNA molecule whose structure is a double helix, and our 
genes, which are comprised of a specific sequence of nitrogenous base 
pairs of adenine-thymine and cytosine-guanine, are located along this 
molecule. The smallest gene is comprised of a sequence of about 1,000 
nitrogenous base pairs and the largest gene is approximately two million. 
As one might imagine, mapping and sequencing this number of genes is a 
time-consuming enterprise. In June, 2000, approximately 90% of the 
genome was mapped and sequenced, and now the task is to complete the 
remaining 10%. Francis Collins, the current Director of the Human 
Genome Project, has stated that the public project should have a highly 
accurate map of the human genome completed well before 2003.2 
James Watson, the former director of the U.S. component of this 
project, recognized early on that there are many important issues of a non-
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scientific nature connected with the genome initiative. He urged that, of 
the $3 billion (or $1 per base pair) that will be funded for the U.S. portion 
of the genome project, at least three percent ($90 million) should be spent 
on examining these issues. He succeeded in his efforts, and so the Joint 
Working Group on the Ethical, Legal and Social Issues Relative to 
Mapping and Sequencing the Human Genome (ELSI) was formed and 
began its work in September 1989.3 Watson was indeed correct about the 
relevance of the ethical issues connected to this initiative. The scientific 
breakthroughs that are being made today because of this research, and those 
that will be made in the future based on the various types of gene transfer, 
present us with extremely complex and far-reaching theological, social and 
moral questions. 
My interest in the Human Genome Project is principally theological 
in nature and scope, although it involves many ethical issues as well. I will 
begin with a claim: none of us enters into the moral evaluation of a 
complex topic such as this one as if one were a tabula rasa or empty slate. 
Rather, our moral judgments are informed and guided by settled 
convictions and beliefs of a non-moral nature. For religious believers, 
these convictions and beliefs are religious in nature. Thus, I want to reflect 
on the Christian theological tradition and indicate how moral judgments 
that Christians attain on issues of human gene transfer are, or ought to be, 
informed and shaped by and partially dependent on specifically theological 
beliefs. In other words, I want to suggest that the moral decisions that 
Christians come to concerning whether or not to support the alteration of 
our genetic code depend partially on a religious context of meaning. This 
religious context can inform and authorize certain moral judgments that 
believers might make. By stating the matter this way, I do not mean to 
imply that one can separate moral and religious experiences. I intend only 
to claim that the two are distinguishable and then to indicate how one can 
influence or qualify the other. Thus, in the case at hand, theological 
convictions can provide perspectives on and engender attitudes about 
genetic manipulation. Furthermore, this religious context does not by itself 
determine moral decision-making for Christians; there are, of course, a 
number of other background issues that function as presuppositions to 
moral judgments on human gene transfer. The following list is merely a 
sample of such issues: the goals and limits of medicine,4 the meaning of 
suffering and illness,S attitudes about genetic disabilities,6 and the relation 
between science and theology.7 Generally speaking, if one or other of the 
genetic technologies to be discussed were found to be inappropriate on 
theological grounds because, for example, their use would usurp God's 
rights over creation, the presumption might be that these same technologies 
as a consequence would be judged morally unjustified. In fact, the claim 
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would be made in this case that such interventions are arrogant attempts at 
"playing God."g On the other hand, if it can be shown theologically that 
certain kinds of human gene transfer are not contrary to the divine's final 
purposes for humanity, then it might be possible, along with other 
evidence, to judge these gene technologies as morally defensible. In the 
conclusion to my presentation I will state where I would stand morally on 
the various forms of human gene transfer. 
II. Six Central Themes from the Roman Catholic Tradition 
Before pursuing the theological concerns, though, I will summarize 
briefly what I believe are the central themes that inform this issue from the 
official Roman Catholic perspective, i.e., from the magisterial teachings of 
recent popes, bishops and the Second Vatican Council. In general, I find 
most official statements since Vatican II (1965) to be quite hopeful and 
favorable toward genetic science with respect to the issue of manipulating 
the human genome as long as certain moral boundaries are respected. What 
are some of these boundaries or themes that pertain to the specific issue of 
human genetic manipulation? There are six. 
First, we are permitted to pursue various genetic manipulations as 
long as we respect the natural law, i.e. , the moral law that is inscribed in 
the nature of humans and their moral acts. In the Catholic tradition the 
order of nature grounds human morality, and this morality is not only 
objective but also in principle capable of being known by all people of 
goodwill. As Cardinal Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II) claimed in his 
book Love and Responsibility, a rational acceptance of the order of nature 
is at the same time a recognition of the rights of the Creator.9 Concretely, 
the natural law requires that we respect the dignity of each human being, 
and thus the natural law would prohibit treating humans and embryos from 
the moment of conception as a means to some other end. Second, the 
official teachings from the Roman Catholic church express a strong ethic of 
stewardship. This ethic points to two things: a) we have a God-given 
responsibility for and toward all creation, including our bodies; and b) we 
are not the owners of our own bodies but only stewards over them, so we 
are not free to manipulate our genetic heritage (or nature) at will. Third, 
the human body is not independent of the spirit. Concretely this means that 
we cannot expect to alter our genes without also altering the body's relation 
.. I . h b d I . 10 to our splfltua natures, I.e., w 0 we are as a 0 y-sou composIte. 
Fourth, genetic experimentation on human subjects, including embryos 
from the moment of conception, are permissible as long as "it tends to real 
promotion of the personal well-being of humans, without harming human 
integrity or worsening human Iife.,,11 The informed consent from the one 
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experimented on or from a legitimate surrogate is absolutely required for 
such experimentations. Fifth, there is a fundamental relationship between 
scientific research and the common good of society. This clearly indicates 
that all such efforts to manipulate the human genome involve not only 
ethical but also public policy implications. Finally, not every scientific 
advance necessarily constitutes a real human progress. Though John Paul 
II is not absolutely opposed to all forms of non-therapeutic genetic 
interventions,12 there are some statements from the U.S. bishops' NCCB 
Committee O(l Science and Human Values that seem to limit genetic testing 
and genetic manipulation to instances in which there is an effective therapy 
or cure of a genetic abnormality for a patient or embryo. \3 Thus, genetic 
manipulation to influence inheritance that is not therapeutic but aimed at 
producing human beings selected according to sex or other predetermined 
qualities (eugenics or enhancement manipulation) is judged contrary to the 
natural law. This last point in particular leads us to a consideration of the 
various types of what is called human gene transfer. 
III. Types of Human Gene Transfer 
Imagine a day when patients with defective genes that cause them 
great disability can walk into a clinic and be given an injection of 
engineered cells that contain the proper sequencing of the genes to cure 
their diseases. Or, imagine a day when prospective patients can simply 
walk into a clinic for assisted reproductive technology and pre-select the 
enhanced genetic traits that their future child will have. This is not just 
science fiction; it will likely become reality in the not-too-distant future. 
Why? Medical scientists could conceivably develop four different types of 
human gene transfer from the results produced in the Human Genome 
Project.14 In other words, medical science will shortly have the capacity to 
alter our genetic code in four ways. The first two types are therapeutic in 
nature because their intent is to correct or prevent some genetic defect that 
causes disease. The other two types are not therapies at all, and many 
question whether they are part of medicine ' s goals as well. Rather, they are 
concerned with improving either various genetic traits of the patient 
himlherself (somatic cells) or with permanently enhancing or engineering 
the genetic endowment ofthe patient's children (germ-line cells). 
The first kind of human gene transfer is somatic cell therapy in which 
a genetic defect in a body cell of a patient could be corrected by using 
various enzymes (restriction enzymes and ligase) to splice out the defect 
and to splice in a healthy gene. Medical scientists have already used a 
variation of this technique to help children who suffer from severe 
combined immune deficiency (ADA) by modifying bone-marrow cells,15 
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and a similar procedure was used in August 1999 for children who have 
Crygler Majjar Symdrome, a genetic disease that causes fatal brain 
damage. 16 Estimates are that between two to five thousand different 
genetic diseases are controlled by one gene,17 and these diseases afflict 
approximately two percent of all live births. 18 Second, there is germ-line 
gene transfer therapy in which either a genetic defect in the reproductive 
cells - egg or sperm cells - of a patient would be repaired or a genetic 
defect in a fertilized ovum would be corrected in vitro before it is 
transferred to its mother's womb. 19 In either case, the patient's future 
children would be free of the defect by permanently altering their genetic 
code. 
Next there are the two kinds of non-therapeutic human gene transfer. 
The first kind is enhancement somatic engineering. In this type, a 
particular gene could be inserted to improve a normal trait, for example, the 
insertion of a new gene or an improved one to enhance memory. Second, 
there is germ-line genetic engineering in which existing genes would be 
altered or new ones inserted into either germ cells or into a fertilized ovum 
such that these genes would then be permanently passed on to improve or 
to enhance traits of the patient's offspring. In this last form of human gene 
transfer parents could design their children according to their own desires. 
IV. Theological Themes 
Whether or not Christian believers and Christian churches will 
support morally any or all of these types of human gene transfer will 
partially depend on where they stand on certain theological beliefs about 
God and humanity. Christians, at least, have regularly made sense out of 
their experiences of God and then communicated these interpretations to 
others by reference to a story that has been reformulated into certain 
doctrinal themes. Traditionally, these themes have been expressed in the 
Christian tradition in terms of creation, fall, incarnation, redemption, and 
eschatology.20 The Christian story tells us that God is the creator of all that 
is and that we are from God and for God. However, sin or alienation from 
God, self and others has entered the world due to human misuse of 
freedom. Yet, God has decided to bind divine history irrevocably to human 
history by becoming incarnate in human form (Jesus is fully human and 
fully divine). Through Jesus' preaching of the Gospel and his passion, 
death and resurrection we are redeemed (redemption) and called to a new 
future in God's eternal kingdom (eschatology). Though all of these themes 
are important, for our purposes, I will discuss only three of them, viz., 
creation, incarnation, and redemption. Again, my purpose in referring to 
these religious themes is to show how moral judgments on human gene 
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transfer rely on and can be authorized by certain theological beliefs and 
interpretations. 
Creation and Divine Providence 
The doctrine of creation is actually a complex set of interpretations of 
who God is and how the divine directs human history and acts within it 
(divine providence). These theological interpretations have 
anthropological counterparts that attempt to understand both how we are to 
evaluate the significance of physical nature and our bodily existence. 
Two different theological models of God, creation and divine 
providence have been historically used in the great Christian tradition. 
Currently, Christians have used both models as a theological context in 
arguing morally for or against human gene transfer. 
In one perspective God is viewed as the creator of both the material 
universe and humanity and the one who has placed universal, fixed laws 
into the very fabric of creation. This view of creation assumes that God's 
purposes for humanity, which are forever unchangeable, can be known by 
reflecting on the universal laws governing nature and humanity. As 
sovereign ruler over the created order, God directs the future through 
divine providence. As Lord of life and death, God possesses certain rights 
over creation, which in some cases have not been delegated to humans for 
their exercise? l When humans take it upon themselves to exercise God's 
rights, for example, those divine rights to decide the future or to change the 
universal laws that govern biological nature, they usurp divine authority 
and thus act contrary to God's purposes in creation and "play God." 
If one adopted the theological positions held in this model, one would 
likely judge as human arrogance any attempt to alter the genetic structure 
of the human genome, possibly even for the therapeutic purpose of curing a 
serious disease. This assessment is confirmed in a TIME/CNN poll 
(January 1994) on people's reaction to genetic research. Not only were 
many respondents ambivalent about genetic research but a substantial 
majority of the respondents (58%) thought that altering human genes in any 
way was against the will ofGod.22 
In a second theological model God is not interpreted as the one who 
has created both physical nature and humanity in their complete and final 
forms. Rather, the divine continues to create in history (creatio continua). 
Consequently, God is not understood as having placed universal, fixed laws 
into the fabric of creation, and so the divine purposes are not as readily 
discernible as in the first model. God's actions both in creation and in 
history continue to influence the world process, which is open to new 
possibilities and even spontaneity.23 Though there is some stable order in 
the universe, creation is not finished, and history remains indeterminate. 
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Because creation was not made perfect from the beginning, one can discern 
certain elements in the created order, like genetic diseases, that are 
disordered. Because these disordered aspects of creation cause great 
human suffering, they are judged to be contrary to God's final purposes and 
so can be corrected by human intervention. Thus, therapeutic types of 
human gene transfer could conceivably be justified in this interpretation, 
though it might be difficult to justify morally the two enhancement types 
(somatic and germ-line). 
As an anthropological counterpart to their interpretations of the 
divine, Christians have consistently understood all humanity to be created 
in the image and likeness of God (Gen. I :26-27). However, the great 
Christian tradition has used at least two different interpretations of how 
humans stand in that image, and these diverse models almost inevitably 
lead to different moral evaluations about interventions into the human 
genome. 
The first interpretation defines humanity as a steward over creation. 
Our moral responsibility, then, is primarily to protect and to conserve what 
the divine has created and ordered. Stewardship is exercised by carefully 
respecting the limits placed by God in the orders of biological nature and 
society.24 It is easy to see how this model is consistent with the 
understanding of God as the creator who has placed universal, fixed laws 
into the very fabric of creation. If we are stewards over both creation and 
our own genetic heritage, then our moral responsibilities do not include the 
alteration of what the divine has created and ordered through nature. Our 
principal moral duties are to remain faithful to God ' s original creative will 
and to respect the laws that are both inherent in creation and function as 
limits to human intervention. In this scenario, most, if not all, forms of 
human gene transfer would be morally prohibited, though some room might 
be permitted for somatic cell therapy . 
. The second interpretation of the imago dei defines humans as created 
co-creators or participants25 with God in the continual unfolding of the 
processes and patterns of creation. As created co-creators, i.e., as beings 
who do not create ex nihilo as God does,26 we are both utterly dependent 
on God for our very existence and simultaneously responsible for creating 
the course of human history. Though we are not God's equals in the act of 
creating, we do playa significant role in bringing creation and history to 
their completion.27 Proponents of this interpretation would almost certainly 
support somatic, and possibly even germ-line, gene transfer aimed at 
therapeutic ends, though it is highly questionable whether they would also 
justify attempts at enhancement gene transfer at either the somatic or germ 
line. 
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A Christian interpretation of the significance and value of both 
physical nature and human bodily existence also plays an important role in 
arriving at moral judgments on genetic interventions. There are several 
different models of material nature that can shape one's moral position on 
human gene transfer, and Christian authors have made use of all of them. 
Each model attempts not only to interpret the nature of all material reality 
but also to understand the extent to which we can use human freedom to 
change our genetic heritage. 
Daniel Callahan has argued that one of the most influential models of 
nature that operates in contemporary society is the power-plasticity model. 
In this view, material nature possesses little or no inherent value, and it is 
viewed as independent of and even alien to humans and their purposes. All 
material reality is simply plastic to be used, dominated and ultimately 
shaped by human freedom.28 Thus, the fundamental purpose of the entire 
physical universe, including human biological nature, is to serve human 
purposes. What is truly human and valuable are self-mastery, self-
development, and self-expression through the exercise of freedom. The 
body is subordinated to the spiritual aspect of humanity, and humans view 
themselves as possessing an unrestricted right to dominate and shape not 
only the body but also its future genetic heritage. This view would be 
strongly inclined to justify morally almost any intervention into the human 
genome, regardless of whether its intent is therapeutic or enhancement. 
The view of nature at the opposite extreme is the sacral-symbiotic 
model in which all material nature, including our genes, is viewed as 
created by God and thus considered as sacred. As created and originally 
ordered by God, human biological nature is static and normative in this 
understanding, and the laws inherent in it must be respected. Humans are 
not masters over nature but stewards who must live in harmony and balance 
with our material nature. Biological nature remains our teacher that shows 
us how to live within the boundaries established by God at creation. Since 
physical nature is considered sacrosanct and inviolate, any alteration of the 
human genetic code, even to cure or prevent a serious genetic disease, 
would probably be morally prohibited. 
The final solution construes material nature as evolving. Whereas 
there is some stability to nature and there are some laws that do govern 
material reality, neither this stability nor these laws are considered 
absolutely normative in moral judgments. Change and development are 
considered more normative than other aspects of nature, and history is seen 
as linear rather than cyclic or episodic.29 The relation between material 
nature and human freedom appears as a dialogue that dynamically evolves 
over time. It is within this dialogue that humans learn how to use 
responsibly material reality as the medium of their own creative self-
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expression.30 This model would seem to grant to humans the freedom and 
responsibility to intervene into our evolving biological nature to correct 
serious diseases even at the germ-line level. The reason is because such 
human efforts would not necessarily be judged as usurping God' s final 
prerogatives or purposes in creation. 
Incarnation 
The fact that God took on human bodily form in the person of Jesus 
Christ has several implications for the discussion of genetic medicine. 
First, this doctrine serves as a context both for assessing the relation 
between body and spirit and for evaluating the significance of the body in 
moral decision making. In tum, these considerations have an impact on the 
question of what we judge to be uniquely or normatively human in moral 
analysis. Both issues function as presuppositions to moral judgments about 
the pennissibility of human gene transfer. 
If one separates, or even grossly distinguishes, body and spirit, there 
is the tendency to view our spiritual part as more nonnatively important or 
even as the solely unique characteristic of the human person. In addition, 
such a view will tend to hold that permanent alterations of the body, which 
would occur through the various types of human gene transfer, do not and 
cannot actually change the fundamental nature of humans. Dr. W. French 
Anderson, arguably the most influential human gene therapist in the U.S., 
once remarked that he had been worried for years that we might end up 
altering our very humanness by methods of human gene transfer, especially 
those aimed at the genn line. However, he has recently decided that Plato 
was correct to view the soul and the body as two distinct entities.31 By 
adopting this Platonic framework, Anderson now believes that we cannot 
alter our fundamental humanness because, as much as we might 
pennanently change our biological genetic code through gene transfer, we 
cannot change that which is uniquely or normatively human about us, viz., 
our soul or that which is beyond our "physical hardware. ,,32 Thus, 
ostensibly Anderson would justify morally both somatic and genn-line 
therapeutic interventions to alter pennanently the human genome. 
An opposing view is the position that holds that there is an intimate 
relation between body and soul. In this construal humans are viewed as 
embodied spirits or ensouled bodies.33 Such an interpretation, then, would 
be far more cautious than the first about making a claim that we cannot 
pennanently alter the nature of humanity through human gene transfer. 
The relation of body and spirit is one, but not the only, element of what 
makes up our fundamental human nature. Thus to alter radically this 
relation of body and spirit would imply the possibility of changing our 
nature in this view. Though proponents of this interpretation could support 
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morally gene transfers aimed at the prevention or curing of disease, they 
would neither encourage nor support enhancement techniques. The reason 
would probably be that in the latter cases of enhancement interventions the 
chances of altering the body-spirit relation might be greatly increased. 
Redemption 
Christians believe not only that we are created, though fallen, beings 
but that we are also redeemed by God through the suffering, death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. Thus, besides God's creative purposes or 
ends, the divine also has redeeming purposes for all creation, i.e., to bring 
all creation fully into God 's kingdom. Christians have sometimes grossly 
separated the creative and redeeming purposes of God. One way to 
understand the relation between these divine activities has been to interpret 
redemption as not only a continuation of creation but the means by which 
creation itself is brought to completion by God.34 
This framework raises the question of whether the technologies to 
alter our genetic code can ever be viewed as potential participations in 
God's redeeming actions toward humanity. Since Christians have 
interpreted humankind as created in the divine image, it has been possible 
to view genetic interventions as possible acts of co-creation with the 
divine. However, now the question is whether it is also possible 
theologically to view our technological activities as potential participations 
in or mediations of God 's redemptive purposes? To answer this question 
requires a brief discussion of various theological evaluations of technology 
in general. 
There are several evaluations of modem technology that could serve 
as the context for our moral judgments on therapeutic techniques to cure 
serious genetic diseases. First, there is the rather pessimistic view of 
technology, an example of which was the position taken by the late Jacques 
Ellul.35 Its characteristics include a very skeptical attitude to the potential 
evils that will come from its development and use. Technology is viewed 
as threat, impersonal, manipulative and alienating, and thus it does not and 
cannot possess the inherent potential to share in the divine purposes of 
redemption, which are viewed as personal, salvific and holistic. In the end, 
this view would probably not support morally any attempt to alter our 
genetic heritage. 
The opposite extreme is an overly optimistic view of technology and 
its potential achievements. Its hallmarks are a focus on the liberating 
function of technology through progress and human fulfillment and an 
emphasis on greater freedom and creative expression. Some, like the Jesuit 
paleontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin,36 have closely linked technology 
and spiritual development and thus have viewed technology as clearly 
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possessing the potential to cooperate with God's work. Some who have 
adopted this position have been quite supportive morally of most fonns of 
human gene transfer, including those fonns whose primary purpose is to 
enhance or engineer our genes. 
The final position seeks to steer a middle course between the two 
extremes of pessimism and optimism. Similar to the first view, proponents 
are cautious about and critical of many features of modern technology. 
However, like the second view these proponents also offer hope that 
technology has the potential to be used for humane moral ends, but 
technology must be redirected in its uses for these ends to be realized. 
There are two fonns of this moderate position currently held by theologians 
that I would like to analyze quickly. Among other things, these views are 
distinguished by how they connect causally sin with disease and death. In 
other words, these positions differ depending on how one interprets St. 
Paul ' s passage in the Letter to the Romans (5: 12): "It is just like the way in 
which, through one man, sin came into the world, and death followed sin, 
and so death spread to all men, because all men sinned." 
The first position links causally the introduction of both death and all 
disease, including genetic disease, to the entrance of sin into the world. 
The role of medicine, then, is to intervene to overcome these effects of sin, 
and these medical interventions, including those aimed at genetic therapy, 
are construed as mediations of God' s redemptive activity. In this same 
view, however, all fonns of human gene transfer whose primary purpose is 
to enhance or engineer the human would be at least morally problematic on 
theological grounds. Why? Because these interventions would not 
alleviate any condition that can be linked causally to the entrance of sin 
into the world. Their purpose would be to enhance the patient or his/her 
progeny, not to overcome the effects of the Fall.37 
The second fonn of the moderate position does not link causally sin 
with disease and thus does not identify disease as such as one of the effects 
of the Fall. Rather, it understands diseases (and for that matter, death) as 
the natural results of being part of the material world where decay and 
entropy are facts of the created world, though sin may very well adversely 
affect our experiences of these realities.38 That does not mean that God 
wills or penn its these ill effects as part of the final divine ordering of the 
universe; in fact, they are judged to be contrary to God 's ultimate purposes. 
The Protestant theologian Ronald Cole-Turner has adopted a position 
similar to this one.39 He has argued that modern technological 
developments in genetics can have the potential for participating in God 's 
redemptive activities. He has reasoned that, when this technology is aimed 
at preventing or curing serious genetic diseases that are deemed contrary 
to God' s final purposes for humanity because they cause great human 
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suffering, this technology can participate in God's redemptive purposes by 
making whole and healthy what was once disordered and destructive. 
Cole-Turner, like the first form of this position, however, does not seem to 
support morally human gene transfer whose primary purpose is 
enhancement, not therapy. 
V. Conclusion 
Given the specifically theological context discussed, it is now time for 
me to state where I would stand morally on the various types of human 
gene transfer that will no doubt result from the Human Genome Project. It 
is my judgment that significant scientific and technical difficulties remain 
to be solved with most forms of human gene transfer. For example, the 
fatal experiment in September 1999 on Jesse Gelsinger, the eighteen-year-
old who had been injected with engineered genes by the University of 
Pennsylvania researchers to cure the boy's rare liver disease, and the recent 
National Institutes of Health order to toughen the rules on the reporting of 
deleterious side effects of gene therapy40 only indicate again that we may 
well be years away from when many of these therapies can be shown to be 
both safe and effective. In addition, there is a number of public policy 
problems with these interventions as well. Consequently, at the present 
time, I am opposed morally to all types of gene transfer, at either the 
somatic or germ-line level, whose only purpose is to enhance or engineer 
human traits. On the other hand, I can support morally therapeutic gene 
transfers on somatic cells, when and as long as these scientific techniques 
can be shown to be safe and effective. In addition, I would also argue on 
Christian theological grounds that once the scientific, public policy and 
moral difficulties can be resolved with germ-line therapeutic interventions, 
we may cautiously move forward with this type of genetic therapy as well, 
i.e., as long as they can be proven to be both safe and effective. In other 
words, based on my theological interpretations of the Christian doctrinal 
themes and their anthropological counterparts already discussed, I conclude 
that in principle the two types of human gene transfer aimed at therapy or 
prevention, viz., somatic and germ-line interventions, are not fundamentally 
contrary to God's purposes for humanity. To use them is not necessarily to 
arrogate to ourselves various functions and tasks that properly belong only 
to the divine. Rather, they have the potential or capacity to mediate God's 
final purposes for humanity. Consequently, their use for the moral ends of 
preventing or curing serious genetic diseases can be a means of properly 
exercising human responsibility.41 
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